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Abstract | The practice of the special procurement of materials and logistical support 
from Japan, operated by the US that emerged after the Korean War, was an influential 
factor defining the Japanese economy through the 1950s. It facilitated the growth of 
Japanese economy by enabling the national annual acquisition of 800 million dollars of 
currency during the Korean War. To sustain economic growth, the Japanese government 
sought to secure new sources to replace the Korean War special procurement after the 
armistice. By utilizing US foreign aid sponsored offshore procurement, Japan was then 
able to acquire further procurement contracts amounting to 400 or 500 million dollars a 
year in the late 1950s. In addition to enabling the government to acquire foreign currency, 
special procurement also served as an opportunity to revive Japanese military industry 
and spearhead national economic influence in Southeast Asia.
 Japan’s economic gains from special procurement were rooted in its deep involvement 
in the US-led Cold War complex in East Asia. During the Korean War, Japan earned its 
special procurement income by undertaking the role of “rear supply base.” To secure 
further procurement of American dollars after the war, the government and business 
community responded to US initiatives and mobilized Japanese industrial productivity 
toward general procurement in support of US military forces, and participated in the 
US foreign aid strategy after the enforcement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan 
secured special economic benefits by actively committing to the US Cold War strategy 
for East Asia. Through these measures, the US fostered Japanese economic power as a 
rear supply base by providing the economic benefits of special procurement. Special 
procurement therefore embodied the shared interests of Japan and the US. On the other 
hand, special procurement also represented a crucial point at which the interests of 
Korea and Japan diverged. Not only because the Korean War special procurement 
occurred at the expense of immeasurable human and material loss within Korea, but 
also because the Korean reconstruction special procurement contributed to another 
form of Japan’s subjugation of the Korean economy.
Keywords | Cold War, special procurement, the Japan-US economic cooperation 
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Introduction
The US offshore special procurement program in Japan sought to provide a 
dollar stimulus to the Japanese economy through the purchase of military 
supplies and other goods and services in the 1950s. The existence of this special 
procurement program directly reflected the role of Japan as a “rear base supply” 
state during the Cold War. This is because it both constituted a substantive 
component of the US military and economic strategy in Asia, and represented 
the Japanese government’s commitment to this. In other words, special procure- 
ment was at “the node (kessetsuten) of the military and economic relationship” 
(Asai 2002b, 221) between Japan and the US. In this regard, a direct analysis of 
the scale and characteristics of special procurement and the wider effects of this 
stimulus on the growth of Japanese economy, will serve to uncover the 
significance of the role that Japan fulfilled as a US rear base supply state in Asia 
during the Cold War.
Special procurement included, but was not limited to, the provision of 
Japanese supplies and services to the US forces during the Korean War. It 
continued to be a factor influencing the Japanese economy until the 1960s, 
changing in shape and form after the Korean armistice and the reinstitution of 
Japanese sovereignty, and the shifts in US aid policies. This paper focuses on 
special procurement during the 1950s because the importance of the program 
for the Japanese economy significantly diminished in the 1960s as US overseas 
aid policies shifted during this period, in tandem with the dollar defense policy1 
and the rapid growth of Japanese economy in the 1950s.
Previous studies on special procurement have primarily dealt with the early 
1950s, during the Korean War. They can be categorized into the following 
topics: the economic effects of special procurement; progress from the Korean 
War special procurement to the “new special procurement” under the “Japan-
US economic cooperation framework”2; and the development of armaments 
special procurement and the revival of the Japanese military industry.
Prior research on the economic effects of special procurement includes the 
work of Nakamura Takafusa, which emphasized the importance of the program 
1. Dollar defense is a term used to describe a series of policy measures the US government took 
after 1960 to improve the nation’s international balance of payments and to maintain the dollar 
value. The initial dollar defense measures focused on export promotion, cuts in foreign aid, “Buy 
American” and “Ship American” requirements, etc. 
2. The “Japan-US economic cooperation” was the terminology used by the Japanese government, 
media, and business community at the time; therefore, it is used instead of the “economic 
cooperation of the US and Japan.”
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during the Korean War, from the aspect of its contribution to raising the ceiling 
of the balance of payments. According to Nakamura, the economic growth rate 
of Japan is limited by its ability to import materials since it has to bring in 
resources. However, the Japanese economy was able to grow rapidly in the 1950s 
due to the size of the US special procurement program during the Korean War, 
which brought an influx of foreign currency income (Nakamura [1978] 1993, 
158).
However, although Nakamura positively evaluated the impact of special 
procurement during the Korean War, he did not specify in detail how it was 
related to rapid Japanese economic growth. In addition to Nakamura, Kōsai 
Yutaka has highlighted the utility of the Korean War special procurement 
program alongside the industrial rationalization policy which attempted to 
lower costs and promote development in the manufacturing industries to boost 
international competitiveness (Kōsai 1981, 1989). Kōsai argues that rationalization 
investment provided preparation and a launch pad for the next period of rapid 
growth, and the reason the Japanese government was initially able to support 
rationalization investment through broad national industrial policies was the 
existence of the Korean War special procurement program. The industrial 
rationalization policy was a transitional policy that utilized the equilibrium of 
the balance of payments (Kōsai 1989, 291),3 which was maintained through the 
special procurement program. 
On the other hand, the research of Yonezawa Yoshie (1994) is significant as it 
attempts to quantitatively examine the effect of special procurement on the 
Japanese economy. The author studied the consequence of special procurement 
in 1951 on the Japanese economy by utilizing the input-output model, which 
considered all direct and indirect (derivative) effects of special procurement. 
The result estimated that the reduction rate of value-added would be from 5.04 
percent (assuming special procurement was given to companies from other 
countries) to 6.25 percent (assuming the Korean War never occurred). Since the 
economic growth rate of 1951 was twelve percent, this means the growth rate 
would have reached even the six or seven percent range had the Korean War not 
occurred. Yonezawa concluded that it would have been difficult for Japan to 
3. The word “transitional” here means the period during which the balance of payments was in 
equilibrium due to the utilization of special procurement. Without this special procurement, the 
Japanese government would have had to promote the equilibrium of the balance of payments 
through the depreciation of the Japanese yen or contractionary policies. Instead, the existence of 
special procurement allowed Japan to implement the industrial rationalization policy, or the policy 
to “strengthen the basis of the balance of payments through modernization investment” (Kōsai 
1989, 291).
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overcome the recession caused by the strictures of the Dodge Line postwar 
financial contraction policy without the Korean War special procurement program.
Nakamura’s (1982) study on the progress toward a “new special procurement” 
program under the “Japan-US economic cooperation framework” is also highly 
significant. Here the author examined the discussion surrounding the Japan-US 
economic cooperation framework that occurred from January 1951 to April 
1952, the period that led to the enforcement of the Treaty of San Francisco 
(hereafter Peace Treaty). Nakamura argued that the “new special procurement” 
of armaments occurred under the “Japan-US economic cooperation framework,” 
the scale of which was equal to that of the wartime emergency “special procure- 
ment” during the Korean War (296). Asai Yoshio (2002b, 2003a, 2003b) expanded 
the findings of Nakamura and attempted to empirically analyze the realized 
portion and the expected portion of the “Japan-US economic cooperation 
framework.” Unfortunately, this study offered only an analysis of the “expected 
portion” since the research was discontinued after considering the content and 
impact of the statement made by William F. Marquat, chief of the Economic and 
Scientific Section, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers (hereafter GHQ/SCAP) in May 1951.4 In other words, a review 
of the “realized portion,” or how the Japan-US economic cooperation framework 
led to a new special procurement program, has yet to be completed.
Regarding special procurement for armaments and the redevelopment of the 
Japanese military industry, Nam Kijeong (2012, 2016) has analyzed the special 
procurement for weapons and military armaments, and emphasized that special 
procurement at the time was directly related to the arms industry and resulted 
in the recovery of Japan’s military industrial complex. However, the long-term 
effect of armaments special procurement on the revival of Japanese arms industry 
production was limited. For instance, Arita Fumiko and Nakamura Takafusa 
(2003) have claimed that the new special procurement of arms under the Japan-
US economic cooperation framework began to appear in 1952, reached its peak 
in 1954, and was practically nonexistent by 1955. Also, “even large companies 
like Komatsu and Kobe Steel had to focus on their areas of advantage due to 
more stable demand, leaving arms production as their secondary business” (52). 
Sawai Minoru (2018) analyzed the effects of the occurrence and termination of 
the arms special procurement program on Japanese defense companies. 
According to this study, this special procurement triggered a revival within the 
military industry, but its termination led to the fall of military armaments 
production as a secondary level business interest that relied on the demand of 
4. For the significance of Marquat Statement, refer to footnote 13.
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Japan Defense Agency (Bōeichō). However, the aforementioned research on 
arms special procurement focused on the munitions special procurement in 
1952-55, but did not mention the further procurement of aircraft, destroyers, 
and military vehicles that occurred through US military aid expenditure in the 
late 1950s.
Unlike the research mentioned above which focus on the early 1950s when 
the Korean War was ongoing, very few studies have dealt with special procure- 
ment during the late 1950s after the cease fire agreement. This might be due to 
the rapid growth of the Japanese economy and relative decline of the scale of 
special procurement in the late 1950s. However, special procurement not only 
functioned to sustain a steady influx of foreign currency amounting to 400 
million or 500 million dollars a year up to the late 1950s, but also played a signi- 
ficant part in the Cold War period US East Asia strategy and the advancement 
of Japan in the region. Japan strived for its own economic interests, at the same 
time as remaining deeply committed to supporting US military and political 
hegemony in East Asia. This commitment is reflected in the effort undertaken 
to secure further US procurement support through the offshore procurement 
(ikigai chōtatsu) of US aid supplies. This article therefore covers both the special 
procurement program during the Korean War and the special procurement of 
the late 1950s during the post-Korean War period which has received little 
attention in existing literature. It is also the aim of this study to clarify the 
significance of special procurement in the 1950s relative to the wider structure 
of Cold War relations.
The Special Procurement Survey (Tokuju chōsa, hereafter SPS) conducted by 
the Special Procurement Office, Enterprises Bureau, Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) (Tsūsanshō Kigyōkyoku Tokujuka), also known as 
the Compensation Special Procurement Office (Kigyōkyoku Baishō Tokujushitsu) 
from March 1954, was created to collect and disseminate details about the effects 
of special procurement after the armistice of the Korean War. The SPS was first 
released in July 1952 and issued monthly until its 214th edition in December 
1969. There are some differences in its content depending on the period, but the 
survey consistently contained details about the amount of monthly special 
procurement received into the country, various related statistical analysis, and 
reports on relevant domestic and international developments. The fact that it 
featured reports on the US budget and aid policy is understandable since special 
procurement was connected closely with American foreign policy.5
5. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Yeo Inman from Gangneung-Wonju National 
University for allowing me to use the data. This data is located at the library of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan. Thanks to this data, I was able to clearly identify 
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An Overview of Special Procurement
1. Definition of Special Procurement
The concept of special procurement initially derived from the demand for 
Japanese supplies and services from the US armed forces during the Korean 
War. However, it came to include other content that was only indirectly related 
to the conflict. Therefore, a clear definition of “special procurement” is essential 
to proceed with this analysis of its precise scale and content. The term included 
two general “narrow” and “broad” procurement demands made by the US 
government, categories I shall now proceed to outline in detail.
The term “narrow special procurement” designates the demand made 
directly by US Forces Japan and related agencies, which placed orders for 
supplies and services in Japan and made payments in foreign currency (usually 
dollars). The Economic Section of the US Embassy made a weekly announcement 
on statistics regarding this type of special procurement as an overall “special 
procurement contract amount.”6 The Japan Logistics Command (JLC) was 
established on August 25, 1950 as a procurement bureau to deal with the demands 
for supplies and services made by the US forces and related agencies.7 However, 
these statistics did not include figures for labor procurement, as these contracts 
were concluded directly by Procurement Agency of Japan.
After October 1952, the narrow special procurement also came to include, 
within the “special contract amount,” the procurement of Emergency Procurement 
Service (EPS) under the General Supply Administration (GSA),8 as well as the 
procurement demands made by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency (UNKRA) after January 1954. The supply procurement of EPS was 
related to the economic aid for Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia distributed 
from within the national US aid budget, which served a different purpose from 
the specific content (contract amount, import amount, and its composition) of special procure- 
ment after the armistice of the Korean War, as well as MITI policies for special procurement, aid 
plans of the US, and their relation to special procurement.
6. The data was collected by the Programs and Statistics Division, Economic and Scientific Section, 
SCAP, until April 1952, by the Procurement and Development Division, Economic Section, the US 
Embassy, until September 1953, and by the Statistics Branch, Foreign Exchange Division, Bank of 
Japan, based on data from the US Embassy since then.
7. On November 14, 1951, the Japan Procurement Agency (JPA) was established as an affiliated 
organ of JLC, and it was reorganized to Army Procurement Agency (APA) residing in Japan in 
January 1957. Most goods for the US Forces Japan were procured through JPA, but some portion 
were supplied through agencies related to the US Air Force and Navy.
8. EPS was renamed in December 1956 as FSS (Federal Supply Service).
  Japan’s Special Procurement in the 1950s and the Cold War Structure  7
the original narrow remit of special military procurement. UNKRA was establi- 
shed on December 1, 1950, but its actual activity began after the armistice of the 
Korean War. Also, due to the objectives of the agency, its procured supplies were 
purely for the reconstruction of Korea.
After the Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952, the figure given for 
special procurement contracts included the amount paid from the Japanese 
government to fulfill their part of the burden-sharing clause for the maintenance 
of foreign military in Japan, in accordance with Article 25 of the US-Japan 
Administrative Agreement. This contract amount paid from the burden sharing 
was in Japanese yen, so it was commonly called the “yen-based contract.” Yen-
based contracts were not included in the special procurement contract amount 
from 1957 because the burden sharing was transferred to the First Defense 
Build-up Program. This yen-based special procurement was not related to any 
foreign currency acquisition because the payment was made in yen.
“Broad special procurement” constituted the line items entered as “foreign 
military or other agency related expenses” and the “sale of yen for the French 
military mission to Japan” in foreign exchange statistics of the Bank of Japan 
(Keizai Shingichō 1954).9 MITI announced this amount as the special procure- 
ment income total, which included yen sales, US forces deposits, Okinawa 
construction costs, ICA, UNKRA, and other US armed forces or UK armed 
forces-related items. The “broad special procurement” or special procurement 
income amount is a generic term for the procurement income in a foreign 
currency (usually US dollars). Therefore, the yen-based special procurement in 
the special procurement contract amount is not included here. The items that 
were classified within the special procurement income amount are listed below 
(Tsūshō Sangyōshō Baishō Tokujushitsu 1961, 83-84).
①  Yen sales: The amount of yen sold by the designated banks (Japanese branches 
of US banks) used by the US forces in exchange for the checks of payment that 
the military forces wrote. The US military used the acquired yen for personal 
expenses for themselves and their families.
②  US forces deposit: A method through which the US armed forces units acquired 
yen by depositing US government checks in checking accounts of the Bank of 
Japan. The US forces disbursement officer used this method to pay for the 
supplies and services that the US forces procured. The US government checks 
were directly paid to Japanese vendors until the Korean Peace Treaty went into 
effect. Then after its enactment, checking accounts owned by the US forces 
9. The “sale of yen for the French military mission to Japan” seems to be a program of special 
procurement related to the French military mission in Japan, but specifics were unavailable. This 
item is not included in the data that is announced as the special procurement income amount.
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were opened in yen at the Bank of Japan to pay for special procurement 
expenditure.
③  Okinawa construction cost: The amount of yen exchanged from foreign cur- 
rency acquired through Japanese vendors winning the bid for the construction 
of US bases in Okinawa. 
④  Other US forces-related: Expenses unrelated to the US armed forces in East 
Asia stationed in Japan and personal transfers to the UN agents in Japan.
⑤  ICA and others: The income gained from exports to countries supported by 
US overseas aid, who were purchasing supplies in Japan using their allotted 
US aid budget. US foreign aid was under the charge of the Mutual Security 
Agency (MSA) and the Technical Cooperation Administration in 1951-53 and 
the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953-55; however, the 
International Cooperation Administration (ICA) that was established as an 
external agency of the Department of State took charge of economic and 
technical matters relating to overseas aid in July 1955. The ICA was then 
integrated into the Agency of International Development (AID) in 1961.
⑥  UK forces-related: The expenses in British pounds of the UK forces in Japan. 
The UK military used the yen sales method, so this amount includes both 
military and personal expenses. Yen sales for the UK forces were terminated in 
1957.
Because the “narrow special procurement” (special procurement contract) 
and “broad special procurement” (special procurement income) are complicated 
and easily confused, figure 1 serves to make them clear. “Purchase orders for 
Figure 1. The relationship between “narrow special procurement” (special procurement 
contract amount) and “broad special procurement” (special procurement income amount)
Narrow special procurement
(Special procurement contract 
amount)
Purchase orders for security 
of operations area (Korea, 
Okinawa, etc.)
EPS orders from MSA 
budget purchase orders for 
UNKRA
Broad special procurement
(Special procurement income 
amount)
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[the] security of operations area” and “purchase orders from MSA budget or 
UNKRA” of “narrow special procurement” are matched with the “US forces 
deposit” and “ICA and others” of “broad special procurement.”
Under the category “US forces deposit,” labor procurement from the 
Procurement Agency is included alongside “purchase orders for [the] security of 
operations area.” In the “ICA and others,” supplies and services procured in 
Japan using the US aid budget purchased by institutions other than US armed 
forces and US-related agencies are included. Meanwhile, the US portion of the 
burden sharing is not included within the category “broad special procurement.” 
2. Trend of Special Procurement Contract Amounts
The special procurement contract amount (narrow special procurement), which 
reached its peak in 1953 at 443 million dollars, was greatly reduced in 1954 to 
237 million dollars, moved down to around 100 million dollars until 1962, and 
went under 100 million dollars after 1963 (table 1). The special procurement 
contract amount was mainly from the US forces, while GSA or UNKRA was 
responsible for only three to five percent of the total supplies contract amount 
annually.
In terms of the supplies and services (ekimu) ratio, supplies were 57.1 percent 
and services were 42.9 percent in total until 1960. The services proportion 
increased in 1952, when it took up over half of the entire contract amount. This 
growth seems to have originated from the higher contract amounts for 
construction and repair costs as the war entered its terminal phase.
The yen-based contracts started in July 1952, and amounted to 120 million 
dollars (twenty-one percent of the total contract amounts) in 1953. However, the 
scale of these contracts shrank to eighteen million dollars in 1954 and became 
almost nonexistent after 1955 (table 2). The yen-based contracts were all related 
to the procurement of the US forces in Japan, with a higher ratio of services 
when compared to the dollar-based contracts. As mentioned earlier, the yen-
based contracts did not contribute to the acquisition of foreign currency since 
the contracts were paid in yen. 
3. The Trend within the Special Procurement Income Amounts
The special procurement income amounts (“broad special procurement”) were 
over 800 million dollars in 1952-53 during the Korean War, but decreased to 500 
million dollars from 1954, after the armistice in Korea, up until 1957. In 1958 
the amount decreased to 400 million dollars, and by 1962 it was further reduced 
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to 300 million dollars (table 3). The special procurement income amount 
dramatically increased from 1966 again, which seems to be attributable to the 
Vietnam War.
The composition of special procurement income amounts showed that the 
US armed forces deposit had its highest proportion during the Korean War. Yet, 
after the Korean War armistice in 1953, yen sales increased, resulting in yen 
sales taking up the greatest portion of special procurement income after 1954. 
This change is due to the decrease of the US forces deposit after the armistice in 
Table 1. Trend of special procurement contract amounts
Year
Amount (in 1,000 dollars) Ratio (%)
Supplies Services Total Supplies Services Total
1950 127,327 64,029 191,356 66.5 33.5 100.0 
1951 254,506 99,134 353,640 72.0 28.0 100.0 
1952 205,373 117,149 322,522 63.7 36.3 100.0 
1953 260,794 183,069 443,863 58.8 41.2 100.0 
1954 104,727 132,693 237,420 44.1 55.9 100.0 
1955 65,748 107,941 173,689 37.9 62.1 100.0 
1956 68,757 95,743 164,500 41.8 58.2 100.0 
1957 131,245 98,363 229,608 57.2 42.8 100.0 
1958 67,392 76,120 143,512 47.0 53.0 100.0 
1959 89,136 67,099 156,235 57.1 42.9 100.0 
1960 93,340 63,822 157,162 59.4 40.6 100.0 
1961 76,365 70,726 147,091 51.9 48.1 100.0 
1962 67,781 48,597 116,378 58.2 41.8 100.0 
1963 18,733 40,826 59,559 31.5 68.5 100.0 
1964 23,035 27,079 50,114 46.0 54.0 100.0 
1965 26,060 29,368 55,428 47.0 53.0 100.0 
1966 60,012 47,427 107,439 55.9 44.1 100.0 
1967 25,960 57,308 83,268 31.2 68.8 100.0 
1968 25,519 61,175 86,694 29.4 70.6 100.0 
1969 18,727 73,626 92,353 20.3 79.7 100.0 
Source: SPS, No.110 (December 1960), No.202 (December 1968).
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Korea, while the yen sales expanded with the increased spending of US military 
personnel as they visited Japan during relocating or vacation after the cease-fire 
(SPS No.25, December 1953).
The proportion of the “ICA and others” increased after 1955, taking up over 
27.2 percent of the special procurement income in 1960. However, it decreased 
to 16.6 percent in 1961, and reduced further to cover only small amounts from 
1962 until it disappeared from statistics after 1964. These changes reflect the 
shift of US aid policies related to the overall dollar policy of the US.
Table 2. Dollar-based and yen-based special procurement contract amounts
Amount (in 1,000 dollars)
Year
Dollar Yen Total
Supplies Services Total Supplies Services Total Supplies Services Total
1950 131,511 61,062 192,573 0 0 131,511 61,062 192,573 
1951 268,594 91,876 360,470 0 0 268,594 91,876 360,470 
1952 161,366 71,250 232,616 20,182 40,949 61,131 181,548 112,199 293,747 
1953 210,803 121,750 332,553 50,685 68,323 119,008 261,488 190,073 451,561 
1954 119,702 117,430 237,132 3,229 15,131 18,360 122,931 132,561 255,492 
1955 66,769 109,288 176,057 0 91 91 66,769 109,379 176,148 
1956 69,260 97,202 166,462 0 26 26 69,260 97,228 166,488 
Ratio (%)
1950 68.3 31.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.3 31.7 100.0 
1951 74.5 25.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 74.5 25.5 100.0 
1952 54.9 24.3 79.2 6.9 13.9 20.8 61.8 38.2 100.0 
1953 46.7 27.0 73.6 11.2 15.1 26.4 57.9 42.1 100.0 
1954 46.9 46.0 92.8 1.3 5.9 7.2 48.1 51.9 100.0 
1955 37.9 62.0 99.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 37.9 62.1 100.0 
1956 41.6 58.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.6 58.4 100.0 
Source:  Keizai Shingichō (1954) for 1950-53; After 1954, SPS No.50 (January 1956), No.62 
(December 1956), and No.65 (March 1957).
Note:  The total has some differences when compared to that of table 1. This discrepancy is 
due to the difference in source data in 1950-53 and because this table relies on 
purchase order amounts rather than contract amounts after 1954.
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The Korean War and Special Procurement
1. The Korean War Special Procurement
As the above overview of the special procurement distribution in the 1950s 
indicates, not all the special procurement at the time was related directly to the 
Korean War. As the armistice negotiations took off and physical confrontations 
began to cease, a different kind of “procurement” emerged, and the term “new 
special procurement” was used to distinguish it from the “Korean special 
procurement” which was directly related to the Korean War.
How big, then, was the Korean War special procurement? This question may 
be important to Koreans since they were stakeholders in the conflict, but 
unfortunately it is virtually impossible to precisely identify the amount of Korean 
War special procurement within the entire special procurement amount. This is 
because it is not only difficult to determine whether the procured supplies at the 
time were used in the Korean War or in Japan or a third arena, but also because 
the line between “directly related” and “indirectly related” to the Korean War is 
entirely ambiguous. Therefore, this paper does not estimate the scale of the 
Korean War special procurement. Instead it assumes the special procurement 
from the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25th, 1950 to the signing of 
armistice in December 1953 as tentatively representative of the entire Korean 
War special procurement. 
Special procurement was most actively used during the Korean War. The 
special procurement contract amount that occurred during this period was 
about 1.311 billion dollars, which accounted for fifty-one percent of the aggregate 
contract amount from 1950 to 1960. In parallel, the special procurement income 
amount was 2.374 billion dollars during the Korean War, which was thirty-nine 
percent of the total income amount from special procurement between 1950 
and 1960. The reason why the special procurement income amount ratio related 
to the Korean War was lower than the special procurement contract amount 
ratio is because the larger portion of yen sales and ICA-related procurement in 
the special procurement income amount is not directly related to the war.
Table 4 shows the ratio of each item within the special procurement contract 
amounts from the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 to 
December 1953. In the supplies sector, fabric and textiles had the highest 
proportion in the first year (July 1950-June 1951), followed by transport 
machinery and metal products. In the second year (July 1951-June 1952), metal 
products had the highest proportion, followed by fabric and textiles, and 
transport machinery. Metal products remained the highest proportion followed 
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Food 3.2 0.5 2.1 11.0 2.6 
Beverages and tobacco 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 
Raw materials 3.5 5.3 5.1 1.9 4.5 
Mineral fuel 3.2 6.5 15.8 25.5 10.2 
Medicine 5.1 9.8 6.8 8.8 7.3 
Rubber products 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.7 
Wood products 3.4 2.9 2.7 1.9 2.9 
Paper and paper products 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 
Fabric and textile 27.2 18.2 9.3 2.3 16.4 
Nonmetal mineral 
products 0.9 4.8 3.0 0.8 2.8 
Primary metal products 4.9 7.2 8.4 3.4 6.7 
Metal products 15.9 18.4 30.7 25.0 22.5 
Machinery 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.6 
Electric machinery 4.0 2.9 2.6 4.4 3.2 




3.3 4.4 3.3 0.9 3.4 
Clothing and shoes 2.1 1.9 1.5 0.2 1.7 
Others 1.0 0.8 1.3 4.3 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Amount (in 1,000 dollars) 229,997 246,164 295,230 57,181 828,570 
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by mineral fuels in the third year (July 1952-June 1953), and the fourth (July-
December 1953). In the services sector, “transport, handling, storage” and 
“repairs and refurbishments,” and “construction” had the highest proportion, 
while “communication and other public projects” gained more ground in the 
third and fourth years.
Table 5 shows the major items that constituted over ten million dollars in 
total in 1950-53. Sacks and cotton cloth from fabrics and textile products, and 
vehicle parts, trucks, and trains from transport machinery were important here, 
with the truck contract amount particularly dominant in the first year. “Arms 
and related parts,” barbed wire (yūshi tessen), steel barbed poles (yūshi tetsuzō 
kōchū), and construction steel were major items within metal products. In 
particular, “arms and related parts” had a dramatic increase in the third year. 
Mineral fuel mainly comprised of coal, which had a large increase in the third 
and fourth years and was usually accounted for through yen-based contracts. 
“Construction and the refurbishment of buildings,” “vehicle repairs,” “handling 
storage,” and “telegraph and telephone” contracts were the largest components 

















storage 39.8 31.2 15.9 22.4 25.2 
Communication and 
other public projects 4.8 5.9 22.5 26.0 16.5 
Construction 11.3 19.6 25.9 19.8 20.3 
Repairs and 
refurbishments 40.0 38.0 30.3 30.1 33.8 
Manufacturing from  
US forces materials 1.6 2.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Professional services 2.1 0.8 2.0 1.2 1.6 
Other services 0.5 2.3 3.2 0.4 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Amount (in 1,000 dollars) 98,927 85,356 181,196 101,433 466,912 
Source: Keizai Shingichō (1954).















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18  CHUNG Jin Sung
within the services sector. Of these, “telegraph and telephone” was concentrated 
in the third and fourth year.
The above breakdown indicates an increasing trend in mineral fuel, medicine, 
and nonmetal mineral products as they enter the second and third year (table 
4). The major items that increased in contract amounts in the second and third 
years were coal, ammonium sulfate, and cement (table 5). This change seems to 
reflect the increase of expenditure on public welfare and reconstruction supplies 
as the Korean War entered its latter stages.
The reason the proportion of metal products increased rapidly in the third 
and fourth years (July 1952-December 1953) was due to the increase in demand 
for arms. This growth is not directly related to the Korean War, as will be 
discussed later, as it was mainly from the procurement of finished weapons 
(usually shells) that were involved with “new special procurement.” The 
contracts for “arms and related parts” in the third and fourth year amounted to 
around eighty million dollars, which was 22.6 percent of the supplies contract 
reserve of the period. In contrast, the total of “arms and related parts” in the first 
and second year (July 1950-June 1952) was around thirty-one million dollars, or 
only 6.5 percent of the supplies contract reserve of the period. This difference 
existed because it was difficult to place large purchase orders for arms from 
Japan since the production of weapons in Japan was officially prohibited during 
the first and second year. Even the armaments that were ordered at the time 
were not finished products, but mainly component parts or accessories such as 
fuel tanks, napalm bomb tanks, fin bombs, parachute flares, rocket bomb guide 
units, and helmets (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Bōei Seisan Iinkai 1964, 76).
2. Korean Reconstruction Special Procurement
As MITI’s report stated, “there are forecasts that the resumption of the armistice 
talks in Korea might reduce special procurement, [but actually it appears that] 
large purchase orders of public welfare supplies from Korea will commence” 
(SPS No.15, April 1953). In this regard, Japanese expectations for reconstruction 
special procurement heightened with the commencement of peace negotiations 
to end the Korean War.
It is difficult to calculate the exact scale of the Korean reconstruction special 
procurement. Instead, information on special procurement contract amounts 
(contracts for supplies to Korea; Kankoku-muke in the original text) to Korea 
from the special procurement contract amount and ICA-related special 
procurement income from special procurement income are used here to provide 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   






























































20  CHUNG Jin Sung
a rough estimate.10 This amount was calculated based on the purchase orders of 
US military-related agencies using the US aid budget. On the other hand, the 
Korean proportion of the ICA-related special procurement income also included 
proceeds from purchase orders other than those made by US armed forces-
related agencies, such as bodies related to the South Korean government. 
Therefore, the ICA-related Korean special procurement income amount is larger 
than the special procurement contract amount to Korea. 
10. The name “Korean reconstruction special procurement” was used only once in SPS as 
“Japanese contracts of Korean reconstruction special procurement” between July 1953 and 
December 1954. The “Japanese contracts of Korean reconstruction special procurement” during 
the period was around 34.35 million dollars, whereas the special procurement contract amount to 
Korea by US forces-related agencies was 15.47 million dollars. The difference is due to the 
inclusion of a 10.567 million dollar (July 1953-June 1954) order for fertilizer aid by the Chicago 
Procurement Office, US Department of the Army, and 7.799 million dollar order (July-December 
1954) from the Overseas Procurement Service of Korea, which were not US forces-related 
agencies, in the “Japanese contracts of Korean reconstruction special procurement” [SPS No.38 
(January 1955); No.44 (July 1955)].
Table 7. Foreign currency received from the ICA budget per country
(in 1,000 dollars)
Year 1955 1956 1959 1960 1961
Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%)
Korea 15,502 (22.1) 30,930 (25.1) 37,241 (33.4) 40,858 (27.7) 26,745 (36.2)
Taiwan 3,237 (4.6) 6,217 (5.0) 11,785 (10.6) 26,555 (18.0) 14,516 (19.6)
Philippines 1,421 (2.0) 649 
Vietnam 29,097 (41.5) 55,849 (45.3) 37,178 (33.4) 37,180 (25.2) 14,849 (20.1)
Cambodia 9,130 (7.4) 3,723 (3.3) 5,549 (3.8) 737 (1.0)
Laos 1,812 (1.5)
India 14,926 (21.3) 9,008 (7.3) 7,973 (7.2) 8,268 (5.6) 4,548 (6.1)
Pakistan 2,459 (3.5) 2,170 (1.8) 6,623 (5.9) 12,670 (8.6) 3,714 (5.0)
Iran 2,110 (3.0) 2,591 (2.1) 1,772 (1.6) 13,717 (9.3) 5,344 (7.2)
Thailand 28 4,856 (3.9)
Indonesia 51 45 
Others 1,283 (1.8) 109 (0.1) 4,884 (4.4) 2,472 (1.7) 3,309 (4.5)
Total 70,074 (100.0) 123,376 (100.0) 111,380 (100.0) 147,269 (100.0) 73,962 (100.0)
Source: SPS No.63 (January 1957), No.110 (December 1960), No.122 (December 1961).
Note: The original data was used for the total if the sum of numbers did not match.

























































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   













   
   
   
   
   
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22  CHUNG Jin Sung
Keeping this difference in mind, the content of the special procurement 
contract to Korea is shown in table 6. According to the table, the special 
procurement contract amount to Korea in 1955 and 1956 was around thirty 
percent of the total contract amount (supplies), but it was reduced to about ten 
percent after 1957. In terms of amount, it was over twenty million dollars in 
1955-57, which then decreased to thirteen million dollars after 1958. The 
composition of special procurement to Korea included reconstruction supplies 
like wood, metal items (like rails), mineral commodities and byproducts (coal, 
cement, etc.), and machinery, which took over sixty percent of the total after 
1955 and over ninety percent in 1955 and 1960.
The ratio of income related to Korea within the special procurement income 
from the ICA budget was twenty to thirty percent (table 7). In terms of the 
amount, it increased to about thirty million dollars in 1956, which was double 
that of the year before. It reached a peak in 1960 with an income of around forty 
million dollars. The composition of income related to Korea is only available for 
1960 and 1961, and it shows that reconstruction supplies comprised the majority, 
as they did with the special procurement contract amounts. Fertilizer was an 
overwhelmingly dominant product in this category (table 8).
Ultimately, the scale of Korean reconstruction special procurement was not 
as large as Japan originally anticipated. The amount of supplies that Korea 
procured from Japan through the ICA budget from 1955 to 1957 was only about 
fifteen percent of what Korea received from the US during the same period. The 
understanding of MITI was that “the amount of supplies ordered from Japan is 
low in comparison to the amount of aid to Korea because a favorable relationship 
between Korea and Japan is fundamentally missing” (SPS No.84, October 1958).
In this respect, that the scale of special procurement for Korean reconstruction 
was not as large as Japan expected was largely due to the resistance of the 
Korean government. As Yi Jong-wŏn (1996) investigated in detail, the Korean 
government was determined to resist the US government imperative to strengthen 
the Japanese economy, which was relying on the Korean War special procure- 
ment program. It wished to exclude Japan from the point of aid supplies 
acquisition.11 However, the Korean government ultimately failed to stand its 
ground against the firm stance of the US and signed “Agreed Minutes of the 
ROK-US Summit” in November 1954, which forbid discriminating against 
specific nations in acquiring aid supplies. Despite this effort by the US to 
privilege Japan, the Korean government continued to boycott Japanese products 
through various methods, including indirect measures.
11. See Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 3 in Yi Jong-wŏn (1996).
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For example, in February 1955 the Korean government decided on purchasing 
Belgian products through the Tonghwa Corporation (Tonghwa Shirŏp) for the 
police uniform material bid despite the fact that it was costed eighth in the 
overall bid ranking. This international bid was held twice, but Belgian products 
with higher prices than Japanese companies won the bid both times. Japan 
objected to the result, which led FOA to reject the establishment of L/COM 
(payment agreement), nullifying the bid (SPS No.40, March 1955). 
The Design of “Japan-US Economic Cooperation Framework” 
and the New Special Procurement
1. The Design of “Japan-US Economic Cooperation Framework”
The heightened expectations for a “new special procurement” program that 
would replace the initial Korean War special procurement as the armistice 
negotiations progressed underpinned the design of the “Japan-US economic 
cooperation framework.” This framework was intended to induce cooperation 
in the deployment of US military procurement, and was supported by the 
Japanese government, business community, journalists, and GHQ/SCAP from 
1951 to 1952 in response to the review of US military to utilize Japanese industrial 
productivity for its logistics procurement.12 The design was formed along three 
main axes: The expansion and continuation of the US military logistics supply 
procurement; Japanese participation in the development of Southeast Asia; and 
the enhancement of Japanese production capabilities to meet the demands of 
the US military (Asai 2001b, 31). However, opinion is divided as to the actual 
initial existence of such a direct intent.
The idea of the strategy behind the “Japan-US economic cooperation frame- 
work” was highlighted in relation to special procurement, to refer to the hope to 
build the economic independence of Japan through an increase in its logistical 
capability. Yet, there was no significant progress after the Marquat statement on 
May 16, 1951 (Keizai Kikakuchō Sengo Keizaishi Hensanshitsu 1957, 321).13 
12. See Yamamoto (1975), Nakamura (1982), and Asai (2003b) for the design of Japan-US 
economic cooperation framework.
13. The Marquat statement was made as a result of discussing the intent of the US government for 
the Japan-US economic cooperation framework while he stayed in Washington, D.C., for three 
weeks on behalf of the Japanese government as the head of the Economics and Science Section, 
GHQ. This statement was the base of the Japan-US economic cooperation framework. Its main 
contents included ① the new special procurement is operated on a commercial basis ② the 
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According to Yamamoto Mitsuru, the “‘Japan-US economic cooperation frame- 
work’ was a plan, hope, expectation, fantasy, slogan, or a combination of such 
that only became the focal point after John F. Dulles’s visit to Japan as a special 
envoy (in January-Feburary 1951),” but ultimately had no realistic backbone 
(Yamamoto 1975, 17). However, Nakamura emphasized “that ‘new special pro- 
curement’ particularly in armaments, similar to the level of wartime emergency 
‘special procurement,’ was secured after July 1951,” as the result of the Japan-US 
economic cooperation framework (Nakamura 1982, 296).
The content of new special procurement was centered on off-the-shelf arms 
purchases. This fact is discussed in the next section. Also addressed is the partial 
realization of the development strategy for Southeast Asia as proposed in the 
Japanese economic cooperation plan through special procurement, and the US 
attempt to support Japan’s participation in Asian markets through serving as an 
intermediary in the procurement of US aid supplies to other Asian countries.
2. Arms Special Procurement
The utilization of Japanese industrial capability to supplement the US military 
mobilization system was a strategic axis of the “Japan-US economic cooperation 
framework.” The US plan to make Japan into a logistical supply center in Asia, 
taking advantage of its industrial development emerged after the outbreak of 
the Korean War. This intent was made clear when the Munition Board wrote a 
memorandum titled “Japan as a Source for the Supply of US Military 
Requirements” on February 1, 1951. Within this a strategy was outlined to utilize 
Japan as the procurement base for logistics and arms to support the US military 
and/or an assistant in the wider program of US military aid to Southeast Asia.14 
As Japan showed its intention to actively commit to greater logistics 
production following this US initiative,15 Marquat, the head of Economics and 
recurrence of inflation in the Japanese economy needed to be prevented and the price level needed 
to come down to the international level, and ③ Japan is best positioned to manage the wider 
development of Southeast Asia. See Keizai Kikakuchō Sengo Keizaishi Hensanshitsu (1957, 365).
14. This memorandum shows “the procurement from Japan expanded the Korean War 
procurement into industrial mobilization for the US strategy in Southeast Asia,” and it can be 
concluded that “the US policy started to reflect the establishment of an entire military blockade of 
East Asia following its lessons from the response to the Korean War” (Asai 2003b, 136).
15. The Japanese government established the Japan-US Economic Cooperation Committee with 
Sutō Hideo, the head of Economic Stabilization, as the chairman on November 16, 1951. The 
committee sent a letter called “Achievement of Independent Economy and Promotion of Economic 
Cooperation” to Marquat, the head of Economics and Science Section, on February 12, 1952, 
declaring that Japan is willing to fully commit to logistics production (Nakamura 1982, 299-300). 
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Science Section, ordered “conditional acceptance of aircraft and arms” on March 
14, 1952. In response, the Japanese government made a partial revision to the 
“Production Restrictions of Arms and Aircraft” in the common regulations of 
the four ministries – International Trade and Industry; Logistics; Education, 
Science, and Culture; and Agriculture – on April 8 the same year. This revision 
resumed the production and repair of armaments and aircraft, marked by the 
order of 528 42-inch mortars from JPA to Osaka Kiko Co., Ltd. (Osaka Kikō) on 
May 3, 1952 (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Bōei Seisan Iinkai 1964, 76).
After the end of World War II, Japan resumed arms production in August 
1950, which was after the outbreak of the Korean War. However, the armaments 
produced at the time in Japan were not finished products; instead, they were 
mainly weapons parts or accessories. The arms special procurement that arose 
with the enactment of the Peace Treaty, on the other hand, was for finished 
products such as munitions. This demand for finished products was expected to 
become the “new special procurement” program that would replace the Korean 
War special procurement that was diminishing with the end of the War.
The new special procurement program was understood to be a constantly 
planned demand since it was not directly connected to a specific war. Keidanren 
stressed “it is constant because of its relation to the collaborative defense plans 
of free nations of the Far East with the US, and it is essentially planned instead 
of being urgent like the Korean special procurement” (Keidanren Jimukyoku 
1952). Also, the Fair Trade Commission described the new special procurement 
in the following terms: (1) “The former special procurement was focused on 
wartime consumables related to operations in Korea excluding the provision of 
services, but the new special procurement is primarily focused on ‘off-the-shelf ’ 
arms and not always directly related to the Korean War” and (2) “it is provided 
for the weapons rental or arms aid for Japan and Asian countries aside from the 
portion that the US military plans to use” (Kōsei Torihiki Iinkai Jimukyoku 
Keizaibu Chōsaka 1953, 2-3).
One reason the new special procurement was considered in terms of a 
constant and planned demand was based on the fact that it was secured through 
the offshore procurement program within the context of MSA aid.16 The rationale 
This movement from the Japanese government was not only closely related to GHQ, but also to 
the Japanese business community that was active in “remilitarization.” See Nakamura (1982, 291); 
Asai (2003b, 151-55); Nam Kijeong (2012, 268-69) for the movement of Japanese business 
community related with the design of “Japan-US Economic Cooperation.”
16. MSA aid is based on Mutual Security Act (MSA, passed in October 1951), and it means the 
external aid of the US provided with the name of “Mutual Security Program (MSP).” Its functions 
included: ① Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), ② Direct Forces Support, ③ Defense 
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behind offshore procurement was to provide aid supplies procured from regional 
allied countries or other friendly nations to the recipient nation instead of pro- 
curing such supplies directly from the US. The Japanese government and business 
community could thus secure a regular dollar income by providing weapons and 
supplies to third party nations through taking advantage of this possibility within 
the US aid budget (special procurement income). The additional hope was that 
this stimulation would nurture the development of the Japanese defense 
industry (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Bōei Seisan Iinkai 1964, 43-44).
As expected, a large, new form of special procurement (arms special procure- 
ment), based on the offshore procurement program occurred from May 1952. 
This order consisted of sixty-four million dollars allotted for arms and related 
parts from July 1952 to June 1953, and was quadruple the previous procurement 
of sixteen million dollars from July 1951 to June 1952 (table 5). Arms special 
procurement then stalled from the second half of 1953 to the first half of 1954, 
but it resumed in May 1954, totaling sixty-three million dollars of expenditure 
until August the same year (table 9).
Such large-scale arms special procurement encouraged many Japanese 
business and government leaders that the national military and armaments 
industry would be revived. In this respect, MITI overtly revealed its expectation 
that special procurement would serve to nurture the defense industry, as it said 
“it seems like the foundation to stimulate [the nation’s] military industry will 
soon be in place as a substantial [arms] order was made last week” (SPS No.13, 
March 1953).
However, the arms special procurement did not last as the Japanese business 
community and government hoped. It soon became clear that the munitions 
orders placed in Japan would be reduced to only ten million dollars in the 1955 
US fiscal year. The government and business community attempted to negotiate 
for the resumption of large munitions deals with the US, but without success. 
This munitions order in Japan was reduced to eight million dollars within the 
1955 US budget, marking the practical end of the munitions component of the 
special procurement program. As table 9 shows, the armaments demand in 1956 
and 1957 then switched to aircraft (liaison) and naval destroyers instead of 
munitions.
It seems like there was distrust from within the US about the Japanese 
Support, ④ Development Assistance, ⑤ Technical Cooperation, and ⑥ Others (UN budget or 
Asian Development Fund). Usually, functions ③ through ⑥ were economic aids. ① and ② were 
managed by the Department of Defense, and ③ Defense Support that covers most of the economic 
aid was under Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) or International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA), and was called FOA aid or ICA aid.
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government’s willingness to develop its defense production and this substantively 
contributed to the end of the munitions special procurement by 1955. In the 
process of negotiation about continued munitions production in 1955, the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the US representative, said 
“the US expected this special order from the US to prime the pump and nurture 
the Japanese defense industry. But it is unfortunate that the Japanese government 
is… not willing to deal with the matter independently. The Japanese government 
says it is unfair to suddenly stop the orders, but the US government is also in a 
difficult position unless the Japanese government can show its intentions” 
(Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Bōei Seisan Iinkai 1964, 130). It can be understood here 
that the US declared its stance in purchasing arms orders only on the condition 
that Japan attempted to independently raise its own defense capabilities. 
Even though it was made possible to now produce armaments in Japan due 
to the new special procurement of munitions, it was hopeless to expect the full 
revival of the Japanese defense industry with only the demand of the Japan 
Defense Agency and without orders from the US military. The companies that 
participated in arms production based on the special procurement order 
subsequently retreated from the defense industry one by one. However, certain 
companies did not give up entirely on defense production, but merely 
drastically reduced their internal defense production rate (Sawai 2018, 59). In 
this sense, MITI’s expectation that special procurement would become “the 
foundation nurturing defense industry” was realized.
MSA Aid and Special Procurement
After Japan signed the MSA agreement with the US,17 special procurement in 
the form of offshore procurement for Asian aid supplies dominated the order. 
The following examines the details of this special procurement oriented to 
military aid and economic aid (includes defense support aid).
1. Military Aid and Special Procurement
The demand for munitions was over in 1955, but special procurement through 
the offshore procurement of logistics and MSA military aid continued into the 
17. The MSA Agreement is an agreement that was formed between the US and recipient countries 
regarding military and economic aid based on the Mutual Security Agreement. The agreement was 
signed on March 8, 1954, between Japan and the US after negotiations that began in the middle of 
1952. See Ishii (2003, 2004) on the MSA negotiations.
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late 1950s, as can be seen in the special procurement contract amounts.
According to table 9, there were around 1.88 million dollars and 19.14 million 
dollars of arms contracts in 1956 and 1957, respectively. This was composed of 
aircraft orders in 1956 and destroyer orders in 1957. The US military acquired 
twenty-seven LM-1 liaison aircraft through offshore procurement from Fuji 
Heavy Industries and provided twenty-four aircraft in 1956 and three aircraft in 
1957 to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Bōei 
Seisan Iinkai 1964, 198). The 1.88-million-dollar contract in 1956 included a 
1.226 million dollar order of twenty-four LM-1 liaison aircraft and their parts 
(SPS No.59, September 1956). In 1957, 18.68 million dollars of armaments 
special procurement occurred through a US military contract to build two 
destroyers in Japan and provide them to Japan (SPS No.69, July 1957).
The acquisition of military vehicles and their parts and the repair services of 
military vehicles took up the largest proportion of offshore procurement based 
on MSA military aid. There was an annual special procurement contract from 
1957 to 1960 in large amounts for vehicles and their parts (table 9).
In 1957, they signed contracts for about nine thousand vehicles to be 
provided to the Japanese Defense Ministry (about thirty-three million dollars) 
and around thirty-eight thousand vehicle parts from Korea and Cambodia to 
repair (around 10.83 million dollars) (SPS No.69, July 1957). Aside from this, 
contracts related to vehicle repairs, new vehicle replacement, and various parts 
to be supplied in Southeast Asia based on a five-year plan of vehicle repair 
occurred until 1960. In 1958, the Army Procurement Agency (APA) made about 
eighteen million dollars’ worth of special procurement due to the procurement 
of 4,748 military vehicles for Southeast Asia (SPS No.89, March 1959), and an 
offshore procurement of four thousand and seventeen thousand vehicles and 
parts for Southeast Asia again occurred in 1959 and 1960 (SPS No.110, February 
1961).
According to table 9, the special procurement contract amount (supplies) in 
1955-56 declined greatly from 120 million dollars to sixty million dollars after 
the demand for munitions disappeared. This amount increased again in 1957 to 
130 million dollars, reaching over the level of 1954 when there was a previous 
large-scale demand, and the contract amount in 1959 and 1960 maintained 
around ninety million dollars. The reason for acquiring close to 100 million 
dollars of special procurement contracts in the late 1950s was due to the offshore 
procurement of military support aid. In particular, about sixty million dollars of 
vehicles and their parts were ordered in 1959 and 1960, covering over fifty 
percent of the special procurement contract amount (supplies).
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2. ICA Aid and Special Procurement
The income from International Cooperation Aid (ICA) and other sources 
within the special procurement income designates the amount Japan earned 
through the offshore procurement of aid supplies to recipient countries within 
the economic aid budget of the US. According to table 3, the proportion of ICA 
funds along with others in the special procurement income amount greatly 
increased from 1955. The income from ICA and others, which was only 2.8 
percent of special procurement income in 1954, increased to 12.7 percent in 
1955 and 20.9 percent in 1956, maintaining over twenty percent until 1960. It 
particularly contributed to the maintenance of a steady 400-500 million dollars 
of special procurement income, accounting for over 100 million dollars of 
annual income from 1956 to 1960, despite the decrease both in yen sales and the 
US military deposit. 
In examining the special procurement income related to the ICA budget per 
country (table 7), the income from supplies procurement for the three nations 
in Indochina including Vietnam accounts for the largest proportion. It is notable 
that Vietnam received the overwhelming ratio of over forty percent of all ICA 
budget related income in both 1955 and 1956. In 1960 and 1961 as well, it 
received twenty-odd percent after Korea. Textiles, chemical products (fertilizers), 
nonmetal products (cement), metal products, and machinery constituted the 
majority of supplies procured from Japan using the ICA budget. It is also of note 
that Korea had significantly larger proportions of chemical products (mostly 
fertilizers) compared to other countries and that their textiles orders were 
minimal.
The Japanese government expected that the supplies procurement from 
Southeast Asia funded by the US aid budget would constitute their major 
special procurement income in the future. As the MITI stated “there have been 
recent movements in the US to procure parts from Japan for machinery to send 
to Southeast Asia. Special procurement for Asian countries will develop and 
replace domestic special procurement that has reached its limit,” as the supply 
acquisition made by the nations of South East Asia increased. Also, MITI stated 
that “the main focus of recent special procurement is moving from acquisition 
to support the maintenance of the US forces in Japan (domestic special procure- 
ment) to acquisition for third party nations with the US foreign aid budget, or 
‘shipped (funazumi) special procurement,’” describing the phenomenon as 
“special procurement that is sailing overseas” (SPS No.49, December 1955).
It was expected that the increase of special procurement orders within 
Southeast Asia will not only enhance the Japanese special procurement income 
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but also heighten the status of Japan as the supply base of aid supplies for 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it was estimated that Japan would be able to also 
secure independent export markets in the region. Under the circumstances of 
the increasing amount of Japanese supply procurement after the Suez Crisis in 
1956, it was understood that “there had always been a movement in the US to 
try to use Japanese industrial power to develop the national economies of 
Southeast Asia, but after the Suez Crisis, Japan was able to further renew its 
importance as the preferred ‘source of procurement.’ The focus for external US 
aid remained in Asia, and Japan had the greatest advantage by far as the supply 
point of such supplies since it was geographically close, enabling the rapid 
execution of planned US aid” (SPS No.65, March 1957). In addition, it was 
considered “obvious that improving Japanese products and technology through 
special procurement will be of benefit in the future to further secure export 
markets.” As part of this understanding special procurement related companies 
were to receive benefits similar to those acquired by export companies (SPS 
No.70, August 1957).
This argument from 1957, that “improving Japanese products and technology 
through special procurement will be of benefit in the future” as a means to 
secure export markets, echoes the development strategy for Southeast Asia that 
appeared in the proposed Japan-US economic cooperation framework in 1952. 
A portion of the development strategy for Southeast Asia called for supplies 
acquisitions such as capital goods and consumables from Japan using the US aid 
for Southeast Asia, alongside the parallel supply of raw material, and this was 
ultimately realized in the form of procuring ICA aid supplies from Japan in the 
late 1950s.
However, the ICA special procurement income dramatically decreased from 
1960 following the execution of the US’s dollar defense policies, whose purpose 
was to improve the balance of payments and maintain the dollar value by 
utilizing agendas such as export promotion, reducing of foreign aid, and overall 
advocacy of “Buy American, Ship American” policies. Specifically, the US 
Department of Defense ordered a large cut of external military purchase orders 
to halt the outflow of gold that was contributing to the worsening international 
balance of the US due to military expenses on October 3, 1960 (SPS No.108, 
October 1960). Also, the Secretary of State ordered the exclusion of nineteen 
countries including Japan from supply procurement within the ICA budget on 
December 5 of the same year (SPS No.109, November 1960). These measures 
resulted in a drastic drop of Japanese special procurement income from ICA aid 
in 1961, and it completely disappeared after dropping down to around one 
million dollars in 1963.
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From a Reliance on Special Procurement to an Escape from 
Special Procurement
When the Korean War began, the most important objective of the Japanese 
economy was to achieve “economic independence.” In the Independent Economic 
Plan (Jiritsu keizai keikaku) that was announced after the outbreak of the 
Korean War, it was stated that economic independence meant “enhancing the 
level of livelihood as much as possible while maintaining the equilibrium of 
international balance” (Hayashi 1957, 99). To achieve the economic development 
that would enable a substantial improvement of living standards, an enhancement 
of income was considered essential. However, the weak economic situation at 
that time made contractionary policy inevitable because any enhancement in 
income would lead to an immediate increase of loss in terms of international 
balance. Therefore, to achieve consistent economic development that could 
enhance domestic living standards, the securing of enough foreign currency to 
increase national income revenues was considered crucial.
The special procurement bursary from the Korean War was essential to this 
aim, as it covered over thirty percent of Japan’s foreign currency income at the 
time (table 10). Additionally, Japan was able to achieve increased economic 
development based on raising import levels, something made possible by the 
increased foreign currency income. Anticipating the downscaling of Korean 
War special procurement funds with the start of the armistice negotiation, the 
Japanese government sought new ways to acquire new special procurement or 
the introduction of foreign capital. This effort led to the Japanese government 
and business community creating a strategic “Japan-US economic cooperation 
framework,” an event which attracted substantial national media attention from 
1951 to 1952. As a result of the “Japan-US economic cooperation framework,” 
the armaments special procurement (consisting of munitions) occurred in 1952-
55, but the framework initiative failed to encourage any further special procure- 
ment or the introduction of foreign capital.18 Therefore, the policy to promote 
the growth of Japanese economy based on special procurement or the introduc- 
tion of foreign capital was revised to actively focus on export-oriented policies 
(Asai 2002a, 199; Ishii 2004, 303).
The “Five-Year Agenda for Economic Independence” (Keizai Jiritsu 5-kanen 
Keikaku), announced in December 1955 as the first official long-term economic 
agenda of the Japanese government, made it clear that economic independence 
18. Asai (2001a, 2001b, 2002a) describes the attempt of the Japanese government at the time to 
introduce foreign capital.
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led by exports would be achieved as the economy came to rely less on special 
procurement.19 According to Asai (2000c, 81), one of the important characteristics 
of this plan was that the import-oriented policy proposed during the Korean 
War special procurement period disappeared and was replaced by a focus on the 
promotion of exports as the most effective method to achieve “economic 
independence.” 
Even though the “Five-Year Agenda for Economic Independence” aimed to 
19. Asai (1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c) explains the creation process and the content of the 
“Five-Year Agenda for Economic Independence.”
Table 10. Foreign currency income and expenditure


















1950 920 389 253 1,309 19.3 962 55 1,017 292 39 
1951 1,405 1,003 677 2,408 28.1 1,658 185 1,843 565 -112 
1952 1,168 939 801 2,107 38.0 1,790 224 2,014 93 -708 
1953 1,245 917 761 2,162 35.2 2,243 232 2,475 -313 -1,074 
1954 1,602 764 590 2,366 24.9 1,767 255 2,022 344 -246 
1955 2,095 745 570 2,840 20.1 1,956 348 2,304 536 -34 
1956 2,495 842 587 3,337 17.6 2,782 516 3,298 39 -548 
1957 2,819 819 529 3,638 14.5 3,347 588 3,935 -297 -826 
1958 2,728 846 489 3,574 13.7 2,488 539 3,027 547 58 




1,844 434 280 2,278 12.3 1,848 369 2,217 61 -219 
Source:  SPS No.109, November 1960. The original data is Bank of Japan Currency 
Statistics (Nihon Ginkō kawase tōkei).
Note:  The ICA income is originally included in trades (exports) from 1960, but it is 
included in special procurement income in this data.
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achieve equilibrium within the international balance of income and expenditure 
without special procurement, the special demand program continued on a large 
scale, resulting in over 500 million dollars of special procurement income even 
in 1960 when the plan called for zero special procurement. Amidst the high rate 
of development and the great increase of exports, special procurement income 
was still responsible for over twenty percent of foreign currency received in 
1955, and remained at over ten percent until 1959 (table 10). Therefore, while it 
is true that special procurement had less impact on the Japanese economy than 
it did during the Korean War, its contribution remained significant.
In this regard, one anonymous bureaucrat who managed the special pro- 
curement section within the MITI criticized the Five-Year Agenda for Economic 
Independence for prioritizing a breakaway from special procurement. He based 
this argument on the fact that it continued to draw a large income. Noting that 
it remained a stable source of foreign currency, he called for the provision of 
benefits to relevant firms. His argument was based on the prospect that the 
demand for procurement would continue due to US activities in the region, 
which had nothing to do with the declining number of US forces in Japan. 
Further, he reasoned that “foreign assistance is one of the most critical external 
policies the US promotes within its global agenda, and abandoning it is too 
costly for the US.” He added, “breaking away from special procurement would 
have been meaningful if procurement was mainly for the stationed troops in 
Japan. But the current special procurement, which serves external US activities, 
provides the foundation for the future economic development of Japan. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop regulation to provide protection and benefits 
for trade and companies engaged in such” (SPS No.68, June 1957).
However, the MITI’s hope for a stable procurement income that would 
derive from the US’s “semi-permanent” foreign assistance policies (SPS No.70, 
August 1957) became uncertain as early as 1958. The US took actions such as 
the transferring of offshore procurement to the US domestic market in 1958 in 
response to recession, which decreased ICA income. In turn, MITI reconsidered 
its optimistic position and claimed “there can be some expectations for special 
procurement related to military aid, but [the continuation of] special procurement 
related to economic aid does not seem so hopeful” (SPS No.86, December 1958). 
It also stated that “ICA related income includes a number of factors that are 
determined by domestic economic situation of the US, so it is difficult to expect 
that Japan will be the supplying nation” (SPS No.89, March 1959). As the dollar 
policy of 1960 was executed, it became clear that any “expectation of purchase 
with the AID (the successor of ICA) budget is dangerous” (SPS No.122, December 
1961). This prediction was realized when special procurement disappeared 
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entirely after 1963. 
In the 1960s, the Japanese reliance on special procurement was no longer a 
realistic option due to changes in US’s external polices. The ultimate breakaway 
from special procurement was not an objective, but an inevitable reality. 
Fortunately, the Japanese economy far outperformed the expected growth rate 
set by the Five-Year Agenda for Economic Independence. Exports were greatly 
increased, which proved that export-based economic independence was 
possible. As such, it was perhaps fortunate that the need for special procurement 
significantly decreased at the exact moment a reliance on such funds became 
realistically difficult.
Conclusion
The program of special procurement that appeared with the outbreak of the 
Korean War was one of the key factors that defined the Japanese economy in the 
1950s. In particular, special procurement allowed a large influx of foreign 
currency which in turn promoted the Japanese economy. Thanks to this policy, 
Japan was able to import not only large amounts of raw materials but also new 
machinery for a rationalized investment that paved the way for high growth. 
Following their concern that special procurement would shrink after the 
Korean armistice, the Japanese government sought a new mode of procurement 
to replace that which supplied the Korean War effort. As a result, additional 
special procurement, based on offshore procurement supplied by the US 
government MSA aid, was secured to achieve 400-500 million dollars of income 
in the late 1950s. In the Five-Year Agenda for Economic Independence announced 
in 1955, the Japanese government made clear its plan to break away from the 
reliance on special procurement and aim for an economic policy based on exports. 
However, this extra influx of 400-500 million dollars of foreign currency remained 
important up until the late 1950s when the economic growth of Japan was still 
strongly dependent on the strength of its international balance of payments.
The economic benefit that Japan gained from special procurement was 
earned through the nation’s support of the US as it implemented its hegemonic 
Cold War strategy in East Asia. Initially, Japan acted faithfully as a rear supply 
base during the Korean War to draw large amounts of special procurement 
income. Then, after the peace treaty in Korea, Japan tried to secure further 
similar income through active participation in the US’s various regional external 
assistance activities. The special procurement of munitions in 1954-55 was from 
an offshore procurement of military aid supplies of the US from Japan, 
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embodying, to a certain degree, the working of “Japan-US economic cooperation 
framework.” Even after the demand for munitions disappeared, special 
procurement from other forms of military aid offshore procurement continued 
in the form of purchase orders for liaison aircraft, naval destroyers, and the 
replacement and repair of military vehicles.
Japan achieved a significant amount of special procurement income through 
not only military aid but also through the offshore procurement of economic 
aid through ICA. As the amount of aid procured for Southeast Asia from Japan 
increased, this introduced the possibility that Japan might become the supply 
base for all US industrial aid given to Southeast Asia, and introduced the further 
expectation that these regional export markets could be acquired. The strategy 
to promote economic development in Southeast Asia using support from Japan 
was one key axis of the US-Japan economic cooperation framework, and it was 
partially realized in the form of the Japanese procurement of aid supplies to 
Southeast Asia. 
Japan earned a large amount of special procurement income from the 
Korean War, but it did not achieve the expected level of gains from procurement 
detailed for the subsequent reconstruction of Korea. This failure was because of 
resistance from the Korean government to acquiring such supplies from Japan. 
The determined effort of the Korean government to exclude Japan from the 
procurement line of aid supplies was officially nullified due to pressure from the 
US, but the Korean government continued to avoid receiving Japanese procure- 
ment through various unofficial methods.
The above analysis lays out the precise details of special procurement as “the 
node (kessetsuten) of the military and economic relationship” between Japan and 
the US. Japan achieved economic benefits in the form of special procurement by 
actively participating in the US Cold War era East Asia policy. Through this 
participation Japan’s economic power developed in relation to its role as a rear 
supply base state in the region. Therefore, the practice of special procurement in 
the 1950s can be considered a point of direct convergence within the Japan-US 
relationship. However, as the US faced its own international balance of payments 
crisis in the 1960s, the Japan-US relationship became unstable, and the restriction 
of offshore procurement due to the US’s dollar defense policy led to a dramatic 
decrease in special procurement. 
On the other hand, special procurement was also the crucial point where the 
interests of Korea, Japan, and the US diverged. The Korean War special procure- 
ment was arguably claimed at the cost of the astronomical material and human 
losses Korea endured, and the special procurement for the reconstruction of 
Korea (Japanese procurement of the US aid supplies to Korea) meant another 
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form of subordination of the Korean economy to the Japanese. The common 
interest in special procurement between the US and Japan on the one hand, and 
the conflicts of Korea-US and Korea-Japan relations on the other, therefore 
demonstrate the “regional twist” (nejire) (Yi Jong-wŏn 1996, 8-9) within the 
1950s US geo-political strategy in East Asia which rendered Korea the frontline 
and Japan the rear supply base.
• Translated by SOHN Dong Jae
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